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A NOTE ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE
NUREMBERG DEBATE
BERxAED D. MELTZER*
History has not and cannot for a long time render its verdict on the
Nuremberg trials. This verdict will, it is clear, depend less on Nuremberg
and on the events which preceded it than on events which are to come.
But debate on the issues raised by the trial is in full swing. It has been
hailed as a significant contribution to international law, order, and jus-
tice.' It has been attacked with a variety of objections: ex post facto,
novelty and confusion, threat to the great traditions of Anglo-American
justice, disrepute for the judiciary, the power of the victors masquerading
as law, a barrier to the development of a democratic legal order in
Germany.
2
Professor Max Rheinstein in the February issue of this Review3
joined the men who have attacked the legal and moral foundations of this
trial. His views are representative of the whole current of criticism. Cer-
tain issues raised by the debate may be clarified by an examination of his
position and the problems which it suggests. 4
His first objection is the conventional one, that the trials involved
punishment in violation of the rule of nulla poena sine lege; that is, they
involved the imposition of punishment on the basis of a standard retro-
* Professorial Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School; formerly Trial Counsel, Office
of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis War Criminality.
I See e.g., Stimson, The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law, 25 Foreign Affairs Mag.
179 (1947).
2See The Nurnberg Novelty, 32 Fortune I4O (Dec., 1945); The Nurnberg Confusion, 34
Fortune 120 (Dec., 1946); Vambery, The Law of the Tribunal, 163 Nation 400 (1946); Pekelis,
To the Nuremberg Court, II5 New Republic 232 (1946); Wyzanski, Nuremberg, a Fair
Trial? 177 Atlantic Monthly 66 (April, 1946); but cf. Wyzanski, Nuremberg in Retrospect,
178 Atlantic Monthly 56 (Dec., x946).
Professor Rheinstein stated his position i4 a review of Glueck, The Nuremberg Trial and
Aggressive War (1946), 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 319 (1947).
4 This comment, which began as a brief discussion of Professor Rheinstein's objections to
Nuremberg, has outrageously expanded into a comment on related objections urged by other
critics. I wish to make it clear that I do not intend to associate Professor Rheinstein with any
of the views which I attribute to other critics unless I explicitly state that these views are
shared by Professor Rheinstein.
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actively defined. In addition, Professor Rheinstein intimates that the
trials were objectionable because the Germans were punished for acts
which were not only legal but were praiseworthy under the Nazi system.
He also suggests that the trials have impeded our attempt to establish
a democratic legal order in Germany. Finally, he sees in Nuremberg the
cause of allegedly arbitrary action by the German Linder (States) acting
under the direction of the United States Military Government.
Although the ex post facto objection does not, in my judgment, raise the
crucial problem, it deserves examination because it has been the heavy
artillery of the critics' attack. The objection is in essence that the pre-war
treaties, commentaries, and other sources of international law did not
constitute a clear international agreement that individuals who launched
an aggressive war were to be punished as criminals. This argument gen-
erally rests on the premise that, if the trials involved the application of a
retroactive standard, they deserve condemnation.
There would be little quarrel with this premise as applied to our own
domestic law. However, reflection on the character of international law
and the purpose and tradition behind the rule against retroactivity sug-
gests that the premise should not be mechanically applied to Nuremberg.
The rule has not been automatically applied in the field of international
law and should not be. There is the example of the Hague Convention
which prescribed rules designed to restrain the barbarity of war. Although
this convention did not provide for punishment of individual offenders,
such punishment has customarily been inflicted for violations of the con-
vention's commands.5 Pirates, to cite another familiar example, have been
subjected to individual punishment even in the absence of prior domestic
or international legislation proividing for punishment or defining its
extent.
6
The differing applicability of the rule nulla poena sine lege in interna-
tional and municipal law, respectively, has the sanction of common sense
as well as of history. The rule has flourished in comparatively well de-
veloped legal systems.7 It has not been applied in primitive and immature
systems of law. During the early development of the common-law system,
offenses which shocked the moral sense of the community were retrospec-
tively transformed into crimes for which individual punishment was
exacted.8 Indeed, Professor Radin tells us:
5 See Transcript of International Military Tribunal, 16874 (1946).
6 Radin, International Crimes, 32 Iowa L. Rev. 33, 41 (1946).
7 Hall, Nulla Poena sine Lege, 47 Yale L.J. 165, 178-8o (i937).
8 Radin, Anglo-American Legal History 241-42 (1936).
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Most of the acts which are unmistakably crimes, acts like murder, robbery, rape,
were punished for centuries although the detailed determination of just what acts
were punishable under these names was found merely in custom and tradition and not
in a statute. In other words, those who killed and robbed were punished because ordi-
nary common sense and a general standard of conduct made their acts wrongful and
dangerous and the perpetrators were not heard to say that they did not know the char-
acter of their acts because no law had specifically prohibited them.9
The strict and automatic application of the rule against retroactivity
to an undeveloped legal system would, of course, have widened the gap
between the developing moral sense of the community and its lagging legal
institutions. It would have made society the prisoner of its own particu-
larly limited legal history. It is a luxury which an immature legal system
cannot afford. The moral in connection with our unfortunately primitive
system of international law requires no extended elaboration. 0
The mechanical application of nulla poena sine lege to protect the Nazi
instigators of aggression would be inconsistent not only with the history
of the doctrine, but also with its purpose. Behind the doctrine is the idea
that it is unjust to punish one who at the time he acted reasonably be-
lieved that his conduct was not culpable,", But the Nazis had read and had
not repudiated the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which had been solemnly signed
by an earlier German government. They were aware of the other interna-
tional formulations which either stated explicitly or implied that aggres-
sive war was an international crime." The Nazis, whatever their contempt
9 Radin, War Crimes and the Crime of War, 2z Va. Q. Rev. 497, 508 (i945).
xoIn this connection, Mr. Justice Jackson in his opening statement argued: "It is true, of
course, that we have no judicial precedent for the Charter. But International Law is more than
a scholarly collection of abstract and immutable principles. It is an outgrowth of treaties
and agreements between nations and of accepted customs. Yet every custom has its origin
in some single act, and every agreement has to be initiated by the action of some state. Unless
we are prepared to abandon every principle of growth for International Law, we cannot deny
that our own day has the right to institute customs and to conclude agreements that will
themselves become sources of a newer and strengthened International Law. International
Law is not capable of development by the normal processes of legislation for there is no
continuing international legislative authority. Innovations and revisions in Interna-
tional Law are brought about by the action of governments designed to meet
a change in circumstances. It grows, as did the Common Law, through decisions
reached from time to time in adapting settled principles to new situations. The fact
is that when the law evolves by the case method, as did the Common Law and as International
Law must do, if it is to advance at all, it advances at the expense of those who wrongly guessed
the law and learned too late their error. The law, so far as International Law can be decreed,
had been clearly pronounced when these acts took place. Hence, I am not disturbed by the
lack of judicial precedent for the inquiry we propose to conduct." i Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression i65 (Office of United States Chief of Council for Prosecution of Axis Criminality,
1946), hereinafter cited as "Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression."
"1 Hall, op. cit. supra note 7, at 171-72.
12 An impressive list of such formulations are discussed in Glueck, The Nuremberg Trial
and Aggressive War 25-34 (1946).
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for the values of Western civilization, knew that under these previously
defined international standards the launching of a modern war of ag-
gression was an act of the highest culpability. Although in their domestic
affairs they glorified war-making, in their international relations, prior to
the attack on Poland, they pretended to defer to the world's repugnance
for war. Thus they repeatedly assured their neighbors and interested
powers like the United States that they intended no aggression. To shield
the Nazi leaders by applying a principle designed to protect men who
acted without knowledge of their culpability would involve a monu-
mental perversion of justice. The mechanical application of a Latin
phrase, however important the value it enshrines, should not be permitted
to victimize the moral sense of the peoples of the world.
Nuremberg does not, in this view, stand or fall on the validity of the
charge that the penalization of aggressive war had an ex post facto aspect.
Even if this charge were conceded, it would not foreclose the considera-
tion which appears to be the overriding one: Where, as in the case of the
Nazi aggression, there has been a grave, deliberate, and flagrant violation
of widely accepted standards; where such a violation necessarily involved
death and misery for millions, it is more important to condemn and punish
such conduct than to follow literally the principle against retroactivity.
It is, to put it differently, more important to vindicate and crystallize
the world's repugnance for aggressive war than mechanically to apply
nulla poena sine lege.
It was reflection on these considerations which impelled Judge Wyzan-
ski to withdraw his previous criticism and to approve the Charter's,3 con-
demnation of aggressive war as a crime. Judge Wyzanski also has offered
a related explanation for the change in his position:
The reasons for my change are that the failure of the international community to
attach the criminal label to such universally condemned conduct would be more likely
to promote arbitrary and discriminatory action by public authorities and to undermine
confidence in the proposition that international agreements are made to be kept, than
the failure of the international community to abide by the maxim that no act can be
punished as a crime unless there was in advance of the act a specific criminal law.14
This is, of course, a value judgment on which men differ. The position
of the critics of Nuremberg is assailable not merely because of their par-
ticular choice of values but because they appear to have made that choice
without considering the history and the purpose of the rule they invoke
13 The Charter of the International Military Tribunal is set forth in i Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression 4.
14 Wyzanski, Nuremberg in Retrospect, 178 Atlantic Monthly 56 (Dec., 1946).
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and the consequence of making it decisive in the particular context
involved.
There may, however, be objection to the claim that there was a general
and unequivocal condemnation of aggressive war. It may be said that it is
easy first to postulate a so-called international community and then to
misjudge its moral sentiments. We know only too well that the standards
which are embodied in lawyers' documents are often not real in the world
of international (or domestic) action. There may be argument that we are
confusing formal standards with meaningful ones when we find a widely
held repugnance for aggressive war prior to 1939. War in Europe had been
almost as natural a relation as peace. Disputes had been resolved by force,
in part because international law had not offered an effective alternative
for securing the redress of even a legitimate grievance. The tradition of
aggression and its moral acceptance in an area bristling with long stand-
ing hates, fears, and rivalries, could not, it may be argued, be destroyed
by a few formal pronouncements, such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Men
did not object to aggression because they considered it wrong, but simply
to an attack on their own country or on a country whose survival was
identified with the interests of their country. In the actual environment
of international relations, to talk of the moral condemnation of aggression
is, we may be told, to find order and morality where only anarchy and
amorality prevail.
The foregoing argument raises questions whose detailed handling re-
quires a knowledge of history and psychology well beyond my equipment.
My intuition is to reject it not merely because it is a counsel of despair and
anarchy which would undermine every international agreement. It denies
any meaning to the whole network of arrangements for the pacific settle-
ment of disputes devised between two world wars. 5 It disregards the most
solemn, widespread, and unequivocal condemnations of aggression. It ig-
nores the igniting appeal of the battle-cry "a war to end wars." It implies
that a leader could have proclaimed a naked war of aggression to his
people and received their applause., 6 Even Hitler did not dare that
expedient.17
XS Note x2 supra.
z
6 In this connection it is significant that, with the exception of Mussolini's attack on
France in 194o, almost all of the wars involving a major power, from Italy's attack on Ethiopia
to Pearl Harbor, were justified by the aggressor nations as being in self-defense. The official
Rome communique concerning the Italian attack against Ethiopia explained it as "necessary
to repel the imminent Abyssinian threat." Bums, Ethiopia and Italy ii (I935). Similarly,
Japan, among other reasons, urged self-defense as a justification for its attack in
Manchuria. See Japan's Case in the Sino-Japanese Dispute, Japan's Delegation to
[Footnotes 16 and x7 continued on following page]
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But even if this gloomy approach had some basis in fact and even if
there were a gap between the sentiment of the Pact of Paris and the actual
sentiments of a substantial number of men or perhaps even of a majority
of men, the enforcement of legal and moral standards which are higher
than personal standards is one form of progress. Hypocrisy, it has been
said, is an attempt to appear better than we are. The enforcement of a
social standard which in this sense is hypocritical is an attempt to create
a better social order. When a standard of conduct has been embodied and
repeatedly reaffirmed, in the most solemn and unequivocal international
formulations, it would be a dangerous invitation to anarchy to disavow
it on the basis of doubtful conjectures as to the "real" state of interna-
tional psychology. There is the same necessity in international law, which
exists in the municipal law, to give controlling effect to objective stand-
ards.
The foregoing discussion has indicated that even if Nuremberg involved
a retroactive aspect, it was not a situation where the ex post facto doctrine
could be properly applied. There is, moreover, an adequate technical
answer to the ex post facto charge-an answer that was suggested by Mr.
justice Jackson in his opening statement 8 and elaborated by M. de
Menthon, the Chief Prosecutor for France. 9 War, whether or nbt it is
the League of Nations 91 (1933). [The Italian and Japanese claims were rejected not only by
the League of Nations but also by public opinion in the western world which loudly con-
demned Japanese and Italian aggression. 133 Nation 352 (193 1); X12 Literary Digest 5 (Jan. 23,
1932); 26 Time 17 (Dec. 21, 1935); 142 Catholic World 358759 (1939)]. See note 17 infra for
Germany's explanation of the German attack on Poland. The Soviet government's announce-
ment concerning the Finnish war claimed that the Soviets were defending themselves against
a Finnish military attack: 34 Time 24 (Dec. 4, 1939). Although the Japanese in attempt-
ing to justify Pearl Harbor did not explicitly claim a military attack by the United States,
they did invoke the claim of self-defense. Hirohito's address, New York Times, p. 2, col. 2
(Dec. 8, 194I); Tojo's address, id. at p. 5, col. 7. Mussolini, however, did not seek to justify
his attack on France in 194o by claiming self-defense. 6 Vital Speeches 5io (i94o). The signifi-
cance of Mussolini's deviation is diluted by several considerations: (i) The military position of
his enemies was so desperate that a claim of self-defense would have been preposterous; (2)
Mussolini was not starting a war but joining an ally whom the world had already stigmatized
as an aggressor.
17 Hitler in his speech to the Reichstag after the German aggression against Poland sought
to create the impression that the Poles had launched a military attack and that they were
acting in self-defense. Sie de Roussy de Sales, Hitler, My New Order 687, 689 (194i).
zs i Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression 164.
X9 In making this argument at Nuremberg the French Prosecutor presented a bit of Pas-
cal's irony:
"Why do you kill me?"
"Don't you live on the other side of the water? My friend, if you lived on this side, I would
be an assassin, and it would be unjust to kill you'as I am doing, but since you live on the
other side, I am an honorable man, and this is just." Transcript of International Military
Tribunal, at 289o-91.
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waged chivalrously, inherently involves a series of acts which for mil-
lennia have been denounced as crimes under every civilized legal system:
deliberate mass killings, assaults, burning-acts that traditionally have
been criminal even without the abominable sadism which the Nazis added.
Prior to the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the international condemnation of
war, these acts were nor punishable if they were an incident of any war,
whether or not aggressive. Prior to these agreements, all wars were con-
sidered legitimaie national activity, which conferred a privilege to kill
and destroy. However, when the nations of the world condemned aggres-
sive war they destroyed that privilege. Thereafter, when the charge of
murder was made against the instigators of aggression, i.e., the instigators
of deliberate mass killings, they could not urge war as a justification and a
defense;20 the international community had solemnly declared that ag-
gressive war was unjustified. Thus, for example, the deliberate killing
of Frenchmen even in the course of a war involved a violation of the
French laws against murder where the French had been the victims of
aggression. Under this approach, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and similar
agreements are important, not because they directly made aggressive war
a crime, but because, by destroying it as a defense, they made the instiga-
tors of aggression subject to the universal laws against murder?' It is these
ancient laws which are the basis for the punishment of aggression pre-
scribed by the Charter. This argument may, in view of the broad issues
raised by Nuremberg, seem unduly technical, but when lawyers insist on
flexing their legalisms, one technicality breeds another.
It may also be objected that this argument proves too much for it
would make the common soldier of an aggressive nation as guilty as the
chief of state. The criminal law has, however, customarily emphasized the
knowledge and intention of the actor. The common soldier misled into the
20 This argument was foreshadowed by Mr. Henry L. Stimson's analysis in 1932 of the
legal effect of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
"War between nations was renounced by the signatories of the Kellog-Briand Pact. This
means that it has become illegal throughout practically the entire world. It is no longer to be
the source and subject of rights. It is no longer to be the principle around which duties, the
conduct, and the rights of nations revolve. It is an illegal thing. Hereafter when two nations
engage in armed conflict either one or both of them must be wrongdoers-violators of this
general treaty law. We no longer draw a circle about them and treat them with the punctilios
of the duelist's code. Instead, we denounce them as lawbreakers. By that very act, we have
made obsolete many legal precedents and have given the legal profession the task of reexam-
ining many of its codes and treaties." See Glueck, op. cit. supra note 12, at 20-21.
2 Under this view, the invaded countries which did not sign the Charter and were not
represented on the Tribunal, in effect authorized the Tribunal to enforce their laws, by ad-
hering to the Charter prior to the beginning of the trial. Eighteen nations in addition to the
four powers who formulated the Charter have adhered to the Charter. Jackson, The Nurem-
berg Case 121 (1947).
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belief that he was defending his country could be distinguished from the
leaders who knowingly planned and launched the aggression.
There is one further objection to the Charter's condemnnation of aggres-
sive war that is related to the ex post facto problem-the absence of a
widely accepted definition of aggression. During the interval between the
two world wars, there was a serious divergence as to whether a comprehen-
sive definition of aggression should be laid down in advance. Opponents of
such a definition feared that it might become a "guidepost for the guilty."
Others urged that a definition of aggression, like definitions of crimes in
municipal law, would promote certainty and security;2 and a number of
states signed treaties incorporating such a definition.2 3 The Charter, how-
ever, neither adopted a pre-existing definition nor formulated a new one.
It stated that aggression was a crime but did not state what aggression
was.
There are, of course, serious problems in formulating an appropriate
definition of aggression, particularly under modern conditions of warfare,
international insecurity, and disorganization. The difficulty is especially
acute in connection with a nation's rights to take action for what it con-
siders to be self-defense-one of the points covered by the reservation of
the United States and other countries to the Kellogg-Briand Pact.24 The
obvious danger is that the right to self-defense may be unilaterally con-
strued as the right to protect any important national interest.
These issues, although serious as abstractions, were not real at Nurem-
berg. Anyone who studies the captured German documents, spread on
record at Nuremberg, will be convinced of the absolute and unequivocal
character of German aggression.2S No one who recalls the comparative
military position of Germany and its victims in 1939 can seriously urge
that Germany was in any danger of, or feared, an attack, or that the war
Germany launched was defensive or preventive.26 Any doubt on that ques-
The problems involved in defining aggression are discussed in 2 Lauterpacht on Oppen-
heim's International Law x59-6o (1935), and authorities cited therein.
23 Tbid.
24 bid.jat x58; see also 2o Transactions of the Grotius Society 197-201 (1935).
2S i Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression 15o-52, 673-733; Jackson, op. cit. supra note 21,
at x31-47. For a similar German view, see Jaspers, The Significance of the Nuremberg Trials,
22 Notre Dame Lawyer i5o, 152-53 (i947).
61 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression 15, 68o-97. Minister of War von Blomberg in a
1937 directive stated: "The general political situation justifies the supposition that Germany
need not consider an attack on any side. Grounds for this are, in addition to the lack of desire
for war in almost all nations, particularly the Western Powers, the deficiencies in the prepared-
ness for war in a number of states of Russia in particular." Jackson, op. cit. supra note 21, at
I51.
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tion would, moreover, be quickly resolved by a reading of the captured
documents. In short, there is no definition of aggression which does not
clearly cover Germany's premeditated attack.
On further analysis, the ex post facto objection has some paradoxical
features. Here it is necessary to recall the background of the provision in
the Charter providing for individual punishment of the instigators of
aggression. This is a melancholy necessity, but our memories seem so
short and appear to have been so blunted by savagery on a monumental
scale, that they must be refreshed. Reliable evidence had indicated that
the war had begun as a deliberate attempt by the Nazis to conquer and
dominate Europe and perhaps the world. Reliable evidence had indicated
that the Nazis had progressively violated the rules and usages of war, and
that their unparalleled violations could not be justified under the most
expansive conception of military necessity.
This progressive abandonment of restraint and chivalry is typical of all
wars, and infects, in varying degrees, both sides. It disturbed Grotius,27
and with even greater reason, must have profoundly disturbed the fram-
ers of the Charter. Although the enormity of Nazi sadism was dear, it was
equally clear that the conventions regulating the waging of war are at best
a fragile barrier between the violence of war and its victims.1 Moreover,
with science's multiplication of horror, a modern war, no matter how
chivalrous, involves so much misery that to punish deviations from the
conventions without punishing the instigators of an aggressive war seems
like a mocking exercise in gentlemanly futility. Accordingly, what was re-
quired was, as Mr. Justice Jackson emphasized,29 the recognition that the
supreme evil and the supreme crime lay in the launching of a war of
aggression.30
With this as a background, the Allies could have chosen from the follow-
ing possibilities in deciding what action to take with respect to the whole
course of Nazi conduct:
(i) To inflict no punishment either for crimes against the peace or for
traditional war crimes.
(2) To inflict punishment only for violations of the rules of war, with
or without granting the opportunity for defense traditionally extended
before such punishment has been imposed.
27 West, Conscience and Society 186 (1945).
23 Goering attacked the Rules of Land Warfare as obsolete and inapplicable to a nation
fighting a modem war. Transcript of International Military Tribunal, 598o-8i. His point
cannot be summarily dismissed.
29 Transcript of International Military Tribunal, at 53.
30 The Tribunal concurred in this view. Ibid., at 168ig.
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(3) In addition to punishing for war crimes, to administer punishment
for aggression, but through "executive justice," that is, summary punish-
ment without trial or opportunity for defense.
(4) To administer punishment for aggression (as well as "war crimes"),
but only according to predetermined standards of guilt and after the
accused had been given a fair opportunity to be heard so that the innocent
would not be punished with the guilty. This alternative, which was em-
bodied in the Charter, was eloquently justified by Mr. Justice Jackson in
his report to the President. 31
Critics of Nuremberg, might, of course, logically argue that no punish-
ment should have been inflicted for the launching of aggression because of
the alleged absence of a clear international understanding that such action
was to constitute a punishable crime. But the critics generally have not
adopted that position. They appear to approve punishment for the instiga-
tors of aggression.32 What they condemn is the use of the judicial process
in the application of criteria of guilt and in the determination of penalties.
Such procedure, the argument goes, brings the judiciary and the whole
ideal of the rule of law into disrepute.
This argument is in essence an objection to granting an accused the
right to defend himself. It is an objection to precautionary measures de-
signed to avoid mistakes-the condemning of men innocent under the
applicable standards of guilt. It is inconsistent with the requirements
31 "What shall we do with them? We could, of course, set them at large without a hearing.
But it has cost unmeasured thousands of American lives to beat and bind these men. To free
them without a trial would mock the dead and make cynics of the living. On the other band,
we could execute or otherwise punish them without a hearing. But undiscriminating executions
or punishments without definite .findings of guilt, fairly arrived at, would violate pledges
repeatedly given, and would not set easily on the American conscience or be remembered by
our children with pride. The only other course is to determine the innocence or guilt of the
accused after a hearing as dispassionate as the times and horrors we deal with will permit, and
upon a record that will leave our reasons and motives clear." Jackson, op. cit. supra note 21,
at 8.
32 See, e.g., The Nurnberg Novelty, op. cit. supra note 2. In "The Nurnberg Novelty,"
the editors of Fortune Magazine, like many other critics of Nuremberg, point to the exile of
Napoleon without trial as a precedent for the view that "executive justice" should have been
administered to the top Nazis. There are, however, several significant differences in the two
situations. The exile of one emperor raised completely different problems from those involved
in devising a procedure for reaching all of the top Nazis indicted at Nuremberg (twenty-two)
and the many more of intermediate importance who will be dealt with in subsequent proceed-
ings on the basis of the principles embodied in the Charter. It, morever, is one thing to decree
a tolerably pleasant exile for one man and another thing to condemn twenty-two leaders to
execution without trial, as Fortune Magazine suggested. Finally, it may be appropriate to
observe that in 1815 the whole network of arrangements for pacific solution of international
disputes and the Kellogg-Briand Pact had not yet been adopted. The Congress of Vienna may
have resorted to "executive measures" only because society had not yet formulated a standard
which could have been applied in a trial.
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of the Geneva Convention. 33 It is the endorsement of lynch law on an
international scale. As judge Parker has said, there is nothing in law,
morals, or common sense to commend it. 34 The critics may label the
Nuremberg trials as "political" rather than "legal," if by that they mean
a program involving the judicial application of principles of guilt defined
by the executive. But it is difficult to see how they can view Nuremberg
as more objectionable than a program of organized violence summarily
implemented by the executive through the army or some other executive
organ.
There is another curious feature in the critics apparent preference for
ex parte condemnation without trial-the notion that the judiciary is
brought into disrepute no matter how fair and dignified the trial it pro-
vides. No one who examines the Nuremberg record and the verdict, as
many of the critics have not, will question the disinterestedness and the
fairness of the Tribunal. Nevertheless, disrepute is said to result from the
judges' application of (allegedly) ex post facto law. In the case at hand it
should be observed that even if the law were ex post facto, the judges did
not make it. They simply applied the law formulated and embodied in the
Charter by the executive representatives of the four Allied powers, in the
sam6 fashion as an administrative tribunal under American law applies
the mandate of the legislature which created it. If there is to be criticism,
it should be based on the fact that the executive made an ex post facto
principle controlling, and not on the fact that the executive established a
court to apply the principles in the light of the evidence produced at a
fair trial. Defendants who are given a right to be heard may prove that
even an allegedly retroactive standard is not applicable to them. How
much more justification the criticism would have if the executive had not
only formulated such a standard but had insisted on its application with-
out the traditional guarantees which we extended to the domestic crimi-
nal or the conventional war criminal who has been caught red-handed.
33 Passing the question of whether all of the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1929
continue to operate after hostilities have ended [see in the Matter of Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 76
(1946)] every consideration behind the convention's requirement (Articles 54, 61, 66, 83) that
prisoners of war accused of war crimes while hostilities are in progress be accorded a trial oper-
ates even though hostilities have ended. There is, moreover, an additional consideration for
insisting on a trial after hostilities are ended. The fear of immediate reprisal against his own
forces no longer operates to check arbitrary action by the captor.
Under the foregoing view, Mr. Justice Jackson's argument that the prisoners at Nurem-
berg, but for the Charter, would not have been entitled to any trial at all is open to question.
Jackson, op. cit. supra note 21, at 121. The prisoners could have invoked the Geneva Conven-
tion. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I, 25 (1942).
34 Parker, the Nuremberg Trial, 3o Am. Jud. Soc. X09, 113 (1946).
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The Tribunal had not only the function of insuring a fair trial but also
of applying the vague principles of guilt written into the Charter. The
Charter did not, unfortunately perhaps, expressly provide for discrimina-
tion between the major planners and instigators of aggression and the
large bulk of the German people. Article 6a made the preparation, initia-
tion, or waging of a war of aggression a crime against the peace. Read
literally, it would have made every German who had worked in a war
plant or had fought as a common soldier guilty of an international crime.
The application of any such all-inclusive standard of guilt would have
been objectionable, It would have ignored differences in power, knowl-
edge, and freedom of choice, considerations which should be reflected in
the application of standards of guilt. Accordingly, Mr. justice Jackson
in his opening statement' s made it clear that the prosecutions' charges,
insofar as they were based on Article 6a of the Charter, were directed only
at the men who with knowledge had played major roles in the planning,
launching, or waging of the Nazi war of aggression.
The Tribunal, in applying section 6a, imposed even greater limitations.
Thus, Fritsche, who had been chief of radio propaganda throughout the
war, was nevertheless acquitted (with the Soviet judge dissenting), be-
cause his role had been a comparatively insignificant one.36 Moreover,
Schacht, who had exercised broad powers in the economic-military field
and who had made a central contribution to German rearmament as
Minister of Economics and Plenilotentiary for Defense until 1937, and
as President of the Reichsbank until 1939, was also acquitted because the
Tribunal (with the Soviet judge again dissenting) was not satisfied that
Schacht had been aware of a specific purpose to use the military machine
for aggression 7 Similarly, Funk, who had succeeded Schacht as Minister
of Economics and as Plenipotentiary and who was found guilty of all the
crimes defined by the Charter, including the ghoulish crime of arranging
for the extraction of the gold fillings of concentration camp victims, was
not condemned to death because his power and influence were dwarfed
by the tremendous authority of Goering, his chief.38
The limitations imposed by the Tribunal, which emphasized knowl-
edge, influence, and the power to resist the compulsions of a police state,
are particularly appropriate when charges of criminality are met with a
defense which stresses coercion by the state. Exponents of executive
ss Jackson, op. cit. supra note 21, at 33, 36.
36 Transcript of International Military Tribunal, at 17o68-69.
37 Ibid., at 17022.
31 Ibid., at 170I3, 17o6.
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punishment would, I believe, approve the general criteria of limitation
applied by the Tribunal however much debate there may be regarding the
merits of the particular applications. Yet in the absence of the crystalliza-
tion of specific issues as the result of taking of evidence and the opportu-
nity for defense in an adversary proceeding, these necessary distinctions
might not have been made.
Professor Rheinstein finds, we have seen, a causal relationship between
the Nuremberg trials and action on the part of the German Dinder under
the direction of the United States Military Government which he believes
is arbitrary. This is not an appropriate place for a discussion of the merits
of the denazification program. It does seem appropriate to observe that
there is no evidence that the granting of a fair hearing at Nuremberg has
promoted excesses in the denazification program. A priori, the opposite
conclusion would seem in order. "It is not too much to hope," said Mr.
Justice Jackson, "that this example of full and fair hearing, and tranquil
and discriminating judgment will do something toward strengthening the
processes of justice in many countries. 39 Moreover, the history of every
defeated country and every liberated one suggests that excesses are the
unavoidable accompaniment of readjustment. Quite apart from Nurem-
berg, there is no reason to expect Germany to avoid this incident of re-
covery from chaos. Nor is there any justification for a modern myth that
would make Nuremberg the Pandora's box of occupation difficulties.
It is true, as Professor Rheinstein suggests, that Germans at Nurem-
berg and under the denazification program have been punished for acts
that were not only legal but praiseworthy under the Nazi law. The attack
on Poland, Belsen, Buchenwald, Auschwitz, the enslavement and deg-
radation of foreign labor, the whole train of organized outrage revealed
by the record at Nuremberg, was legal and praiseworthy under the Nazi
system. Indeed, it was the Nazi system. Yet the defendants themselves
recognized that their own law could not override the requirements of
international law and human decency. Hans Frank, formerly Governor-
General of Poland, in his testimony before the tribunal stated: "A thou-
sand years will pass and this guilt of Germany [for the extermination of
the Jews] will still not be erased. '40 The intimation that legality under the
Nazi legal system should be a defense against international accountabil-
ity is in essence a suggestion that we abandon all of the rules which have
been painfully evolved to mitigate the excesses of war and to outlaw it.
39 Final report to the President, quoted in Jackson, op. cit. supra note 21, at xvi.
40 Transcript of International Military Tribunal, at 809g.
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The logic of this suggestion again leads to the conclusion that the Nazis
be immune from any punishment whatever.4'
Professor Rheinstein also finds that Nuremberg has impeded the
restoration of law and order in Germany. One can speculate regarding the
impact of Nuremberg on the imagination of thoughtful Germans.42 The
rubble of German cities and the regime of misery which is the legacy of
Nazi aggression might, one would be entitled to hope, persuade the
Germans that the architects of their chaos deserved punishment. In any
event, one German philosopher, although recognizing, as all thoughtful
men have, the difficulties of enforcing international standards of conduct
in our primitive international order, has blessed the trials.43 Whatever the
state of German cynicism about law and order and democracy, it is doubt-
ful that the Nuremberg procedure has depreciated those ideals in the
German imagination. Would the Germans have been less cynical about
law and order if the Allies immediately after the war had drawn up an
ex parte execution list without providing for judicial determination of
guilt? There is not the slightest shred of proof that any of the other
possible methods of dealing with the Nazi leaders would have made a
greater contribution to the reintegration of Germany into the civilized
world.
There is one criticism in the current debate which is more troublesome.
41 I wish to make it clear that Professor Rlaeinstein in his book,review did not take the
position that "legality" under the Nazi system should be a defense to the Nazi leaders who had
decreed that torture, murder, and inhumanity should be "legal." He has, moreover, in con-
versation, emphasized that in his view this defense should be open only to the mass of little
fellows. Although a distinction between the Nazi leaders and the Nazi masses is desirable (see
supra, p. 466), it would not be desirable to rest the protection of insignificant Nazis on the
ground that their conduct was "legal" under the Nazi system. Such a justification too easily
becomes a plea of superior orders and tends to ignore the quality of the allegedly legal acts.
A hypothetical case will illustrate the nature of the difficulty: suppose a German concentration
camp guard acting "legally" deliberately tortured and killed Poles in the camp. Should the
combination of the guard's insignificance and the "legality" of his conduct automatically
immunize him? Even making the further assumption, that the guard was acting under specific
orders and that his disobedience night have meant his death, we know from the life-boat cases
and the rules of war, that self-preservation is not necessarily the final law. Cf. Hitchler, Neces-
sity as a Defense in Criminal Cases, 33 Dick. L. Rev. x38 (1929); 5o Harv. L. Rev. 982 (x937);
Cal. Pen. Code (Deering, 1937) § 26; Sophocles, Antigone.
International prosecution of action required by the commands of a police state raises a
serious ethical problem which becomes more acute as prosecution moves away from the leaders.
The proper treatment of this problem would in my judgment require a more flexible and dis-
criminating standard than legality under the Nazi system even if that standard were applied in
the light of the actor's knowledge and responsibility.
42 Informal advice from the Department of State indicates that polls have been conducted
among the Germans to determine their reaction to the Nuremberg trials. Unfortunately, the
Department could not make the results of these polls available in time for inclusion in this
note.
43 Jaspers, op. cit. supra note 21.
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It is, in my judgment, the central difficulty of Nuremberg: The governing
law has not been equally applied. The standards of guilt have been applied
only to the enemy. They have not been applied to our Allies or to our-
selves. The Russians are not forced to defend their operations in Finland
or Poland. We are not required to justify Hiroshima. 44 The barbarity of
the Nazis and the fact that it was their aggression which unleashed the
whole chain of horrors strengthens our relative moral position. But while
this justifies the actual application of a unilateral standard at Nuremberg
it cannot conceal the imperfect character of such a standard.
Nuremberg, however, merely reflects that inequality; it did not produce
it. The inequality is the product of a primitive international order. The
victor, long before Nuremberg, has applied a unilateral standard in, for
example, dealing with traditional war crimes. He has punished the un-
chivalrous conduct of the enemy; the same conduct by his own forces has
largely gone unpunished. Unless we had been prepared to comb our own
ranks for violators of the rules of war, the logic of the inequality argument
would have required us to give the Nazis complete immunity, for all of
their crimes-traditional war crimes as well as crimes against the peace.
Even the critics shrink from this position. We can justifiably abandon it
for the reasons already given, the enormous greater depravity of the
Nazis, and the fact that they deliberately launched the aggression without
which our comparatively minor deviations from accepted usages would
not have occurred.
This inequality will persist until we have succeeded in the central task
of our time-the building of a just, universal, and enforceable system of
international law. The Nuremberg trials, like the San Francisco Confer-
ence, should be viewed as a dedication to this task. Nuremberg can be an
important symbol helping in its achievement. And if we succeed, Nurem-
berg will stand as a great landmark in the struggle for an orderly, peaceful,
and just international system. If we fail, we shall hear again-and this
time from the rubble of the world-an attack on Nuremberg as power
pretending to be justice.
44 See Compton, If the Atomic Bomb Had Not Been Used, 178 Atlantic Monthly 54 (Dec.,
1946).
